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INTRODUCTION
Protecting the environment, both living and non-living, is important. Mining, too, is important, as it
provides the raw products for many of today’s “necessities,” including cobalt, nickel, and the rare earth
metals used in electronics. Deep seabed mining (DSM) is an important and emerging field within the Law
of the Sea as countries and companies expand their production of minerals. The International Seabed Area
(The Area), which is the seabed and subsoil area beyond national jurisdictions, the subject for this type of
mining, was deemed to be the “common heritage of mankind” and outside the jurisdiction of any one
State.1 This required separate governance structured under Part XI of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).2
This article will focus on liabilities for the Area and examine the question of liability for the
various actors involved, including contractors/operators who carry out the exploitation of resources,
sponsoring States, flag States, and the International Seabed Authority. It is necessary to analyze the
current state of liability provisions, should environmental damage occur in the Area. The rapid pace of
technological advancement and the unknown extent of environmental damage make a fulsome liability
regime necessary. Unfortunately, as will be shown in this article, there are still extensive unknowns in the
legal landscape.
This article will investigate two areas of liability: the standard of liability (strict, negligence, and
whether there is a potential for a due diligence defense, active act, or mens rea requirements) and the
extent of liability (limited or unlimited damage claim potentials). The UNCLOS seems to provide for one
type of liability for operators, but the subsequent legislation, as will be shown, seems to “water down”
liabilities, making a detailed analysis required.
Given the scope of this article, not all areas of liability can be addressed. There are many other
areas of liability that need to be assessed in subsequent research, including procedural claims, the types of
due diligence defenses, and whether environmental impact assessments and plans of work would fulfill
these requirements, the assessment of damages and the ability to pay, and the creation of DSM insurance
to handle any liability claims.
This article will be structured as follows. Part 1 will detail the history and context of DSM. Part 2
is subdivided into two sections: the first subsection will detail the current UNCLOS and regulatory state
of liability for DSM, while the second subsection will identify gaps in liabilities both from the historical
context and from the current governance regime. Part 3 will investigate the domestic legislation of several
countries to determine if any gaps are filled by domestic laws, as required by the UNCLOS.3 Part 4 will
research other maritime liability regimes, including civil liability regimes, to attempt to show how a
system could be developed to deal with all aspects of liabilities. Part 5 will synthesize the current research
†

This article was the winning entry in the 2018 Ocean Yearbook Student Paper Competition.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 United Nations Treaty Series 397, entered
into force on Nov. 1, 1994, Article 136; See also M. Lodge, “The common heritage of mankind,” The International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27 (2012): 733–742.
2
Id., Part XI.
3
Given the parameters of this article, it is not possible to canvass every country with an interest in DSM in the Area.
Thus, the countries of Singapore, Nauru, Tonga, China, Canada, the U.S.A., and New Zealand will be chosen.
Follow-up research will investigate other countries with potential DSM claims, such as the EU, India, Russia, the
U.K., and others.
1
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and recommend changes to the development of liability standards, including the creation of an
environmental fund.
PART 1 – CONTEXT AND LIABILITY ISSUES
The Deep Seabed (DSB) extends on the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the
Area, and is defined as any seabed surface below 200 m.4 It is thought to contain vast quantities of
minerals, resources, and potentially oil and gas. 5 The DSB encompasses not only the Area, but also the
continental shelf (CS) and EEZ.6 Resources are defined in Article 133 of the UNCLOS as “all solid,
liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic
nodules.”7 It is believed to be a next frontier for extractive industries,8 as it is seen as solving two issues:
first, the potential decline in on-shore mineral resources, such as copper and rare-earth metals,9 and
second, that developing countries may benefit from resource extraction as a route to economic
development.10
DSM has not been a significant issue to date due to a lack of technologies that could exploit the
Area.11 However, extractive technologies are advancing at a rapid pace and are almost at commercial
readiness.12 Given that much of the DSB is found at depths of 1.5 km and commercial quantities from
3000 to 6,000 m,13 there is a great risk of environmental damage conducted by any exploration or
exploitation.
There was no fulsome regulatory regime for the Area in the UNCLOS. Rather, Part XI created the
International Seabed Authority (ISA) to regulate activities.14 The ISA may exercise control in the Area, as
is necessary, to ensure compliance with Part XI, and all countries are obligated to ensure compliance with
Article 139.15 The ISA is thus responsible for all DSM in the Area.16 To obtain a permit to explore the
Area for DSM, a sponsoring state must submit a Plan of Work.17 As of the date of this article, twenty
eight exploration contracts have been issued by the ISA. 18 Yet, despite this number of permits, there are
several important legal issues related to DSM that have not been fully developed, including both liability
and environmental assessment (EA) requirements.
4

M. Lodge, “The International Seabed Authority and deep seabed mining,” UN Chronicle 54:2 (2017): 44–46.
A. Jaeckel, J. Ardron and K. Gjerde, “Sharing benefits of the common heritage of mankind: Is the deep seabed
mining regime ready?,” Marine Policy 70 (2016): 198–204.
6
UNCLOS provides that the CS and EEZ are within national jurisdiction of States and thus outside the scope of this
research.
7
UNCLOS, n. 1 above, Article 133.
8
International Seabed Authority, “Towards the Development of a Regulatory Framework for Polymetallic Nodule
Exploitation in the Area, Technical Study No. 11 (Jamaica: ISA, 2013).
9
R.E. Kim, “Should deep seabed mining be allowed?” Marine Policy 82 (2017): 134–137, p. 135.
10
L.D. Bolong, “Into the abyss: Rationalizing commercial deep seabed mining through pragmatism and
international law,” Tulane Law Review 26 (2016): 128–180, p. 132.
11
R.E. Boschen et al., “Mining of deep-sea seafloor massive sulfides: A review of the deposits, their benthic
communities, impacts from mining, regulatory frameworks and management strategies ,” Ocean & Coastal
Management 84 (2013): 54–67, p. 55.
12
Id., p. 56.
13
International Seabed Authority, Proposed Technologies for Mining Deep-seabed Polymetallic Nodules,
Proceedings of the ISA’s Workshop held in Kingston, Jamaica, (3–6 August 1999) ISA/2001/07 at 34.
14
UNCLOS, Part XI, Section 4, Article 156.
15
Id., Article 153(4).
16
Id., Article 157.
17
D.K. Anton, R.A. Makgill and C.R. Payne, “ITLOS / Case No. 17, Seabed Mining – Advisory Opinion on
Responsibility and Liability,” Environmental Policy and Law 41, no. 2 (2011): 60-65
18
ISA, Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors, (2018), available online: <https://www.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-mineralscontractors>.
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In 2009, the small island state of Nauru asked the ISA to seek an Advisory Opinion, as mandated
under Article 191 of UNCLOS, to clarify the liability of sponsoring states.19 On February 1, 2011, the
Seabed Disputes Chamber (SDC) released its Advisory Opinion on State Liability (Case 17).20 This
Advisory Opinion is important in several respects, in that it illustrates a number of concepts, principles,
and norms, it advances jurisprudence, and it was the first time that NGOs took part in proceedings of the
Chamber.21 Deepening potential environmental hazards is the issue that State parties are not the only
potential sources of environmental damage, as many States do not have the technical nor financial
capabilities to undertake DSM. 22 For example, Nauru admitted that
recognizing this, Nauru’s sponsorship of Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. was originally premised
on the assumption that Nauru could effectively mitigate (with a high degree of certainty) the
potential liabilities or costs arising from its sponsorship. This was important, as these liabilities
or costs could, in some responsibilities and obligations of states with respect to 17 activities in
the area (advisory opinion of 1 February 2011) circumstances, far exceed the financial
capacities of Nauru (as well as those of many other developing States). Unlike terrestrial
mining, in which a State generally only risks losing that which it already has (for example, its
natural environment), if a developing State can be held liable for activities in the Area, the State
may potentially face losing more than it actually has. 23
Case 17 also clarified certain jurisdictional issues. It clarified that the jurisdiction of the ISA only relates
to the exploration and exploitation of minerals from the seabed and lifting them to the surface. 24 It does
not include processing on land or transportation from the high seas superjacent to the Area.25 This has
impacts on liability and insurability, in that damage occurring in the Area is regulated by the ISA, but as
soon as a vessel crossed into another marine area, then other UNCLOS provisions apply.26 As will be
discussed, this poses liability issues with DSM and potentially necessitates a harmonious relationship
with EEZ and territorial water provisions, whether or not these provisions provide adequate
environmental protections.
The UNCLOS is vague on the liability standard for States. Case 17 analyzed the “duty to ensure”
obligation (i.e., the due diligence obligation) not to cause environmental harm. 27 The SDC deemed that
this due diligence defense obligation is not one of result but of conduct.28 It also then implied that this
standard would place limits on States’ liability,29 and the obligation would be met if a State employed, on
19

Anton et al., n. 17 above, p. 61.
Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area
(Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber) (ITLOS Case No. 17) (1 February 2011)
ITLOS Reports 2011. The SBC was created under UNCLOS, Part XI, s. 5 and Annex VI.
21
A. Dolidze, “Advisory opinion on responsibility and liability for international seabed mining (ITLOS Case 17)
and the future of NGO participation in the international legal process,” ILSA Journal of International &
Comparative Law 19, no. 2 (2013): 379–418.
22
T. Poisel, “Deep seabed mining: Implications of seabed disputes chamber’s advisory opinion,” Australian
International law Journal 19 (2012): 213–233, p. 215.
23
Case 17, n. 20 above, para 4.
24
Id., paras. 94 and 95.
25
Id., para. 96; see also Anton et al, n. 17 above, p. 62.
26
Y. Tanaka, “Obligations and liability of sponsoring states concerning activities in the Area : Reflections on the
ITLOS advisory opinion of 1 February 2011,” Netherlands International Law Review 60, no 2 (2013): 205–230, p.
209.
27
UNCLOS, Article 139(1). See also Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 108.
28
I. Plakokefalos, “Seabed disputes chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea responsibilities and
obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area,” Journal of Environmental
Law 24, no. 1 (2011): 133–143, p. 136.
29
Id., p. 247.
20
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a best-efforts basis, a contractor’s compliance.30 It also specifically ruled out the application of strict
liability against the State.31
Question 2 of Case 17 stated: “What is the extent of liability of a State Party for any failure to
comply with the provisions of the Convention, in particular Part XI, and the 1994 Agreement, by an entity
that it has sponsored under Article 153, paragraph 2(b), of the Convention?”32 The SDC stated: “In
Question 2, the English term “liability” refers to the consequences of a breach of the sponsoring State’s
obligations.”33 Anton notes that it is customary in international law to first look at the private contractor
for compensation of harm caused by a wrongful act, even if attributed to the State.34 It is only if total
compensation is not achieved that residual liability to the State might be applied.35 There is thus a major
gap, should serious environmental damage take place. Moreover, the court did not address several major
issues, as will be discussed later. Specifically, the court noted, “Considering that the potential for damage,
particularly to the marine environment, may increase during the exploitation phase, it is to be expected
that member States of the Authority will further deal with the issue of liability in future regulations on
exploitation. The Chamber would like to emphasize that it does not consider itself to be called upon to lay
down such future rules on liability.” 36
Substantial developments have taken place since Case 17 was released. Two main developments
that require the speedier development of liability regulations include new scientific discoveries and the
rapid development of technologies which are making commercial exploitation of the Area feasible.
Scientific uncertainty in the Area and the need to apply the Precautionary Approach to DSM cannot be
overstated. For example, in 2015, a group of researchers from the University of Rhode Island discovered
large numbers of egg cases adjacent to hydrothermal vents off the coast of the Galapagos Islands.37 This
was the first case of this type of behaviour among a marine animal recovered. These vents are the same
vents thought to hold massive amounts of mineral deposits, and are soon to be explored in the DSB,
providing evidence that exploration of the Area’s DSB could have a material impact on the marine living
environment.38 As will be discussed, the types of mining will vary according to the type of mineral in the
Area. As such, a range of differing toxic metal mixtures may be released into the sea. This has been
shown to disrupt an organism’s cell structure, at least in the territorial waters area.39 Scientists do not yet
know if the effects on land or shallow waters apply to the DSB, and many urge the use of the “weight of
evidence approach” and a more scientifically based environmental assessment process, as there are still
too many unknowns as it relates to the DSB.40 These are just two small examples of the scientific
uncertainty surrounding the Area, should environmental damage occur.
However, time is running out for this weight of evidence approach to be more fully developed, as
there are now technologies available that can mine at depths below 1.5 km. The first commercial
30

Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 110.
Id., para. 189.
32
Id., para. 164.
33
Id., para. 70.
34
D.K. Anton, “The principle of residual liability in the seabed disputes chamber of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea: The advisory opinion on responsibility and liability for international seabed mining (ITLOS
Case No. 17),” McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 7, (2012): 241–257, p.
249; see also G. Doeker and T. Gehring, “Private or international liability for transnational environmental damage:
The precedent of conventional liability regimes,” Journal of Environmental Law 2, no. 1 (1990): 1–16 and
International Law Commission, n. 8 above, paras. 340–386.
35
Id., p. 247.
36
Case 17, n 20 above, para. 168.
37
P. Salinas-de-León et al., “Deep-sea hydrothermal vents as natural egg-case incubators at the Galapagos Rift,”
Scientific Reports, 8:1788 (2018): 1–7, available online: <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-20046-4>
38
Id., p. 5.
39
C. Hauton et al., “Identifying toxic impacts of metals potentially released du ring deep sea mining: A synthesis of
the challenges and quantifying risk,” Frontiers of Marine Science 4:368 (2017): 1–13, p. 9.
40
Id., p. 12.
31
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operation of DSM will take place off the coast of Papua New Guinea (“PNG”) in 2019, if financial
hurdles are overcome.41 At approximately 35 km from PNG, and sitting at a depth of 1,600 m, the
Solwara 1 project will use innovative mining techniques to extract copper, with some gold deposits
having potential commercial significance.42 Although the project will take place in the EEZ of PNG, the
depth of the drilling and type of extraction shows similarities to other DSM in the Area. Additionally, as
will be described below, PNG has partnered with Nautilus Minerals Inc. (Nautilus), a Canadian company
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange,43 to be the Contractor.44 As is the case with Tonga and Nauru in
the Area, PNG does not have the financial, or the technical resources, to conduct DSM on its own. 45
Nautilus does not own the vessel, but has chartered the vessel from Dubai-based Marine Assets
Corporation.46 This highlights a fourth party that could have liability – that is the “flag State” vessel.47
Solwara 1 is also important as Nautilus also owns a valued license in the Clarion Clipperton Zone
(CCZ).48 The results of Solwara 1 and any environmental damage from the mining may have a profound
influence on the development of extraction in the Area. 49 The type and quantum of damage in the EEZ,
and the resulting liabilities to the parties would provide meaningful data applicable to the Area.50 Further
research is required.
In 2011, Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML), a sponsored company of the Tonga
government, but owned by Nautilus Minerals, was granted approximately 75,000 sq. km in the highly
prospective CCZ.51 The CCZ has been identified by the ISA as a zone of particular importance, especially
41

Mining Watch Canada, “Nautilus AGM: Solwara 1 Deep Sea Mining Venture Remains a Speculative Pipe
Dream,” Press Release (28 June 2017), available online: <https://miningwatch.ca/news/2017/6/28/nautilus -agmsolwara-1-deep-sea-mining-venture-remains-speculative-pipe-dream>. See also, Deep Sea Mining Campaign,
Former Attorney General of Papua New Guinea: The writing is on the wall for Solwara 1 – PNG should withdraw
its investment before it’s too late (17 January 2018), Media Release. However, according to its own disclosures, a
Q3 2019 is still targeted. See Nautilus Minerals Inc., Material Change Report 51-102F1 (28 February 2018)
accessed via SEDAR.
42
K. Gena, “Deep sea mining of submarine hydrothermal deposits and its possible environmental impact in Manus
Basin, Papua New Guinea,” Procedia Earth and Planetary Science 6 (2013): 226–233, p. 230.
43
Nautilus Minerals is a Canadian mining company listed on the TSX, ticker symbol “NUS.” Having only a market
capitalization of approximately CA$127 million and a negative revenue stream at the time of writing, there is a real
risk of the project having serious financial issues, which would indicate that any environmental damage would have
serious financial repercussions. For a video depicting the vessel to be used and the mining techniques employed, see
<http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/video-gallery.aspx?RID=421>.
44
“Nautilus Minerals Receives World’s First Deep-Sea Mining Lease for Solwara 1,” Sea Technology 52:3 (2011):
49.
45
H. Rosenbaum, Out of our depth: Mining the ocean floor in Papua New Guinea . (online: Mining Watch Canada,
2011). available online: http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/wp-content/uploads/Out-Of-Our-Depth-lowres.pdf
46
M. Schuler, “First Deep Sea Mining Production Vessel Launched in China,” (30 March 2018) Press Release,
available online: <http://gcaptain.com/first-deep-sea-mining-production-vessel-launched-in-china/>.
47
The Flag State of this vessel is still unclear. This vessel was built in China by Fujian Mawei shipbuilding, and the
basic design for the seabed mining vessel is provided by SeaTech Solutions International, a marine designs specialist
based in Singapore. The takeaway is the number of parties involved and issues of liability (which design flaw,
construction problem, or maintenance issue) are all to be determined. There are still many financial issues with this
project. See Material Change Report, BCSC Form 51-102F3, Nautilus Minerals Inc., (18 December 2017).
48
As a TSX-listed issuer, NUS is mandated to provide securities laws disclosures. See Technical Report, TOML
Clarion Clipperton Zone Project, Pacific Ocean), (27 February 2018), made pursuant to Standards of Disclosure for
Mineral Projects, BCSC NI 43-101 (9 May 2016).
49
Nautilus Minerals Niugini Limited, Environmental impact statement: Solwara 1 Project (2008) available online:
<http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/pdf/environment-reports/EnvironmentalImpactStatementMain
Report.pdf>.
50
Technical Report, n. 48 above.
51
P. Taumoepeau, “Re: Developing a Regulatory Framework for Mineral Exploitation in the Area – Report to
Members of the Authority and all Stakeholders,” Letter to ISA from Tonga Offshore Mining Limited, (25 May 2015)
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from an environmental perspective. 52 From a DSM perspective, the CCZ is an area particularly rich in
polymetallic nodules.53 From an environmental perspective, it is also of significance. As such, in July,
2012, the ISA adopted an Environmental Management Plan for the CCZ. 54 This Plan has a provision for
an EA but no additional liability provisions. 55 Given the decision in Case 17, that due diligence standards
may differ depending on the type of mining, it is imperative to have higher standards for environmental
liabilities in the CCZ.
PART 2 – CURRENT STATE OF EA AND MINING REGULATION IN THE AREA
Given the historical context discussed above, it is necessary to investigate the current state of regulation
in the Area. Article 145 of the UNCLOS contains basic environmental protection requirements, stating
that the ISA shall adopt rules regulations and procedures for the prevention, reduction, and control of
pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, including the ecological balance and the
protection of flora and fauna. 56 Article 139 of the UNCLOS sets out basic liability requirements for the
Area.57 Article 139(2) notes that damage caused by the failure of a State Party or international
organization to carry out its responsibilities “shall entail liability” [emphasis added].58 This liability is
joint and several between the State and the Contractor. However, a State is not liable for damage caused
by any failure of the Contractor to comply if the State has taken “all necessary and appropriate
measures” [emphasis added] to secure effective compliance under Article 153(4), and Annex III(4)(4).59
This carve-out provision is contained in Annex III, Article 4(4), stating that the Sponsoring State shall
ensure that the Contractor shall carry out its activities according to the contract and the UNCLOS.
However, the Sponsoring State is not [emphasis added] liable due to damage caused by any failure of a
contractor, sponsored by the State, to comply with its obligations if that State Party has adopted laws and
regulations and taken administrative measures which are, within the framework of its legal system,
reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction. 60 Article 209 requires
States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution coming from activities in the
Area – laws which shall be no less effective than the international rules.61 Furthermore, section 235
necessitates domestic legislation for compensation or other relief of damage caused by pollution of the
marine environment.62 Finally, Annex III, Article 22, states that the contractor shall have liability arising
out of wrongful acts [emphasis added] in the conduct of its operations. 63 The ISA itself can be liable
under the same provision, in that the ISA shall be liable for any damage arising out of wrongful acts in the
exercise of its powers and functions. 64
(Jamaica: ISA, available online: <https://www.isa.org.jm/sites/default/files/toml_0.pdf>. See also ISA contract, (11
January 2012) between TOML and ISA.
52
ISA, Legal and Technical Commission, Rationale, and recommendations for the establishment of preservation
reference areas for nodule mining in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone ISBA/14/LTC/2* (28 March 2008).
53
ISA, A geological model of polymetallic nodule deposits in the Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone (ISA Technical
Study no. 6) (Kingston, Jamaica: International Seabed Authority, 2010).
54
ISA, Decision of the Council relating to an environmental management plan for the Clarion -Clipperton Zone,
ISBA/18/C/22 (26 July 2012).
55
ISA, Environmental Management Plan for the Clarion -Clipperton Zone, ISBA/17/ LTC/7 (13 July, 2011).
56
UNCLOS, n. 1 above, Article 145.
57
Id., Article 139.
58
Id., Article 139(2)
59
Id., Article 139(2).
60
1994 Agreement, Annex III, Article 4, para. 4.
61
UNCLOS, n. 1 above, Article 209(2) this is the basis of flag State liability.
62
Id., Article 235(2).
63
Id., Annex III, Article 22.
64
Id.
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The language used in the UNCLOS seems to be conflicting. In Article 139(2), the sponsoring
state escapes liability only if “all necessary and appropriate measures” have been taken.65 Yet, Annex III
merely requires adoption of laws that are “reasonably appropriate for securing compliance.” 66 Even in the
UNCLOS, there is a weakening of liability for Sponsoring States. However, Case 17 did not address all
issues of liability. To this end, the ISA has developed regulations that are the primary means by which the
ISA develops procedures and rules around all aspects of DSM.67 Relevant to this article are the Mining
Code, article 165(5) recommendations, and the Draft Regulations.
The Mining Code is the collection of the regulations adopted by the ISA.68 The ISA, to date, has
recommended and adopted three sets of regulations dealing with DSM. They are: Regulations on
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (Nodules Regs);69 Regulations on
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area (Sulphides Regs);70 and Regulations
on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area (Cobalt Crusts
Regs).71 These regulations are designed to apply to the exploration and prospecting of the Area, and
directly apply to exploitation of Resources. 72 As noted in Case 17, there may be a different due diligence
requirement for each of the types of mining,73 yet the drafting of each of the regulations is similar. Thus,
there may be a gap between the decision of Case 17 and the regulatory standards required under the Code.
Throughout the Mining Code, the protection of the environment is noted as important.74 In the
Nodules Regs, Regulation 2 states that Prospectors and the Authority shall use the Precautionary
Approach.75 Regulation 2(3) of the Cobalt Crusts Regs states that prospecting shall not be undertaken if
substantial evidence indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine environment. 76 It is worth noting that
while the Sulphides Regs provide the obligation to apply “best environmental practices” for the
sponsoring State, there is no similar reference in the earlier Nodules Regs. 77 Regulation 30 of the Nodules
Regs states that responsibility and liability of the contractor and of the authority shall be in accordance
65

Id. Article 139(2)
Id., Annex III
67
A. Jaeckel, “Deep sea bed mining and adaptive management: The procedural challenges for the International
Seabed Authority,” Marine Policy 70 (2016): 205–211, p. 207.
68
ISA, Mining Code, available online: <https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code>. The Mining Code of the ISA is the
set of rules regulations and procedures issued by the ISA to regulate the prospecting exploration and exploitation of
marine minerals in the Area.
69
ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, ISBA/6/A/18 (13 July
2000), amended by ISBA/ 19/A/9; ISBA/19/A/12 (25 July 2013) and ISBA/20/A/9 (24 July 2014). Nodules include
manganese, cobalt, copper, and nickel.
70
ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area, ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1
(15 November 2010), amended by ISBA/19/A/12 (25 July 2013) and ISBA/20/A/10 (24 July 2014). Polymetallic
sulphides means hydrothermally formed deposits of sulphides and accompanying mineral resources in the Area
which contain concentrations of metals including, inter alia, copper, lead, zinc, gold and silver.
71
ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt -rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area,
ISBA/18/A/11 (27 July 2012), amended by ISBA/19/A/12 (25 July 2013). The definition of cobalt-rich
ferromanganese crusts includes: cobalt-rich iron/manganese (ferromanganese) hydroxide/oxide deposits formed
from direct precipitation of minerals from seawater onto hard substrates containing minor but significant
concentrations of cobalt, titanium, nickel, platinum, molybdenum, tellurium, cerium, other metallic and rare earth
elements.
72
Id., Preamble.
73
Case 17, n. 20 above, para. 136 for best environmental practices, para. 142 for EA and due diligence, para. 154 for
developing States and due diligence and para. 242, the ruling.
74
E. Van Doorn, “Environmental aspects of the mining code: Preserving humankind’s common heritage while
opening Pardo’s box?,” Marine Policy 70 (2016): 192–197, p. 195.
75
Nodules Regs, n. 69 above, Regulation 2.
76
Cobalt Crusts Regs., n. 71 above, s. 2(3).
77
J. Gao, “The responsibilities and obligations of the sponsoring states advisory opinion,” Chinese Journal of
International Law 12 (2013): 771–786, p. 775.
66
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with the UNCLOS.78 The contractor shall continue to have responsibility for any damage arising out of
“wrongful acts in the conduct of its operations” [emphasis added], in particular damage to the marine
environment, after the completion of the exploration phase. 79 The key section here is “damage arising out
of wrongful acts in the conduct of its operations.” 80 This would seem to preclude any strict liability, and
even the due diligence threshold may not be applicable. Yet there is no guidance on how this could be
interpreted.
Given an estimated minimum USD 1 billion capital cost to develop a nodule processing plant,81
and the potential for these minerals to be used in a long-term strategic procurement initiative,82 the lack of
more stringent liability provisions is problematic. Some of the issues are thought to be dealt with via
contract law.83 For example, the Cobalt Crusts Regs Annex IV Standard clauses for exploration contract
provides for liability in contractual terms. 84
Complementing the Mining Code are the Recommendations. Under Article 165(2) of the
UNCLOS, the ISA Legal and Technical Commission may make recommendations on the protection of
the marine environment. 85 On March 1, 2013, the LTC released its recommendations for the guidance of
contractors for the assessment of the possible environmental impacts arising from exploration for marine
minerals in the Area (“Recommendations”).86 Under the guise of the Precautionary Approach, the
Recommendations state that every plan of work for exploration for marine minerals shall take into
consideration the following phases of environmental studies: (a) Environmental baseline studies; (b)
Monitoring to ensure that no serious harm is caused to the marine environment from activities during
prospecting and exploration; and (c) Monitoring during and after testing of collecting systems and
equipment.87 Unfortunately, liability guidelines are silent in the recommendations. 88 Moreover, these
recommendations deal only with exploration and prospecting, not commercial activity where most of the
environmental damage is thought to occur.
On August 8, 2017, the ISA released its Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources
in the Area, (Draft Regulations)89 with an explanatory note from the Secretariat on August 10, 2017. 90
78

Cobalt Crusts Regs, n. 66 above, s. 32.
Nodules Regs, n. 69 above, Regulation 30.
80
Id.
81
E. Egede, “African states and participation in deep seabed mining: Problems and prospects,” The International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24 (2009): 683–712, p. 685. Given the age of this article, it would be likely
even more expensive to build. These costs cannot be ignored relative to developing nations and the ‘common
heritage of mankind’ doctrine, as it will most likely entail large transnational corporations or large state owned
enterprises that become the Contractors.
82
Id., p. 700.
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For example, in the responses to the Draft Regulations, several countries argue that terms should be defined in the
contracts section, not in the regulations.
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Cobalt Crusts Regs, n. 71 above, Annex IV.
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UNCLOS, Article 165(2).
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ISA, Recommendations for the guidance of contractors for the assessment of the possible environmental impacts
rising from exploration for marine minerals in the Area , International Seabed Authority ISBA/19/LTC/8 (1 March
2013).
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Id., para. 11.
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The Legal and Technical Commission during their March and July 2018 meetings will begin to investigate
guidelines to complement the Draft Regulations.
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ISA, Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area, (8 August 2017) ISBA/23/LTC/CRP.3.
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ISA, Draft regulations on exploitation of mineral resources in the Area, Note by the Secretariat, (10 August 2017)
ISBA/23/C/12 Unfortunately, due diligence and other liability issues were mostly ignored. For example, question 2,
of the Note states: “Contract area: for areas within a contract area not identified as mining areas, what due diligence
obligations should be placed on a contractor as regards continued exploration activities? Such obliga tions could
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The Draft Regulations contain a comprehensive set of environmental assessment provisions.91 These
regulations, unfortunately, fall far short of implementing a full liability regime for environmental harms.
The Draft Regulations contain provisions for the application process, environmental impact assessment,
and Performance Guarantees. 92 Annex V contains the Environmental Impact Statement Template. 93
The liability provisions are contained in Annex X, Section 8, which states:
8.1 The Contractor shall be liable to the Authority for the actual amount of any damage,
including damage to the Marine Environment, arising out of its wrongful acts or omissions,
[emphasis added] and those of its employees, subcontractors, agents and all persons engaged in
working or acting for them in the conduct of its operations under this Contract, including the
costs of reasonable measures to prevent, limit, and ameliorate damage to the Marine
Environment, account being taken of any contributory acts or omissions by the Authority or
third parties. This clause survives the termination of the Contract and applies to all damage
caused by the Contractor regardless of whether it is caused or arises before, during, or after the
completion of the Exploitation Activities or Contract term. 94
This is an important term in the contract, and seems to contradict Article 139 and Case 17. It provides that
the liability is to the ISA, and not any one government, and survives the end of the Contract. It also
provides for damages being the actual amount of damages, so it does not appear that damage claims will
be limited. Also, as previously noted, the ISA is a party with potential liability over damage to the marine
environment. Draft Regulation 8.2 provides for an indemnity to the ISA stating:
8.2 The Contractor shall indemnify the Authority [emphasis added], its employees,
subcontractors and agents against all claims and liabilities of any third party arising out of any
wrongful acts or omissions of the Contractor and its employees, agents and subcontractors, and
all persons engaged in working or acting for them in the conduct of its operations under this
Contract.95
Of clear note, both Draft Regulation 8 and the Draft Contract only call for damages related to
“wrongful acts or omissions”96 [emphasis added]. There are no strict liability or negligence provisions; as
such, these regulations are incomplete. It is unclear about due diligence or mens rea requirements. It is
also unclear whether other compensatory or punitive damage claims could be advanced, as it states
“actual amount of damage.” 97 It provides additional evidence that the ISA is a party and could potentially
be liable for environmental harms. Unfortunately, this indemnification is vague on details.
Annex X of the Draft Regulations contains the Standard Clauses for exploitation contract. 98 Like
most contracts, its focus is on the rights and titles to the minerals, and it is, unfortunately, very brief and
vague on environmental liabilities. 99 Under section 3.2(d), the contractor must file an environmental
management and monitoring plan;100 and under section 3.3, the contractor shall carry out its obligations
under this contract with “due diligence, efficiency, and economy, with due regard to the effect of its
activities on the marine environment, and exercising reasonable regard for other activities in the marine
91
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Draft Regulations, n. 89 above, Regulation 9.
93
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Id., Annex X – Section 8.1.
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96
Id., Section 8.
97
Id. Section 8.3
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environment.”101 Potentially, this plan of work and contractual obligations could satisfy the due diligence
defense, if applicable.
In January 2017, prior to the release of the initial Draft Regulations, the ISA released a working
paper on environmental matters.102 The paper draws upon the experience from land-based mining and oil
and gas regimes, the shipping industry, and deep-sea fishing activities.103 One clear recommendation is on
the creation of the “Environmental Liability Trust Fund.”104 The initial draft of the Draft Regulations also
contained a substantive provision for a financial guarantee or security that would assist in liability claims
and would help offset the costs of environmental remediation.105 The published Draft Regulations have
been watered down, creating instead a “Performance Guarantee” provision which is much less robust. 106
The published Draft Regulations do not mention any trust, technology, or environmental liability fund.
Thus, the watered-down regulations either do not address gaps in liabilities or they create them.
Stakeholder submissions to the Draft Regulations were released in January, 2018.107 Of note was
Australia’s response, which will be detailed below.108 However, there is still much discussion and
disagreement in the international community on the Draft Regulations, environmental protections, and the
gaps in environmental liabilities. The ISA has stated its goal of having the Draft Regulations adopted by
2020,109 so time is of the essence.
On September 28 and 29, 2017, a legal working group convened to develop a work plan to carry
out further research. 110 After a review of current UNCLOS and domestic legislation, the working group
noted several issues. These involved liability in context of “effective control” and the role of sponsoring
states, key sources of risks, potential failure of sea-floor tools, including the production vessel itself,
collisions, and the potential roles of environmental funds, bonds, and insurance.111 Arising out of the
conference came six bundles of issues: the purpose and scope of the regime, channeling liability/effective
control, actionable damage, procedures, standards of liability, and form of the regime. 112 This article will
address several of these issues.
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From March 5 to 8, 2018, the ISA convened Part I the 24th Session of the ISA (the Session), with
the goal of having the next round of draft regulations available in July, 2018.113 Day 1 of the Session
outlined the purpose of the meeting, and, for purposes of this article, there are several important
discussion points, including: the role of the sponsoring state, the role of legal status of standards and LTC
guidelines, the broader environmental policy and regulations on exploitation, and the roles of the ISA. 114
The ISA noted that compliance of contractors was not a pressing issue due to the preliminary nature of the
work, but now that prototyping and full operation is near, compliance will become important. 115 Day 3
featured consideration of the role of sponsoring states, the ISA and contractors, including questions of
liability, and the role and legal status of standards, recommendations and guidelines. 116 There are also
discussions on the legally binding nature of the ISA rules and guidelines. 117
Part 1 of the Session did not provide consensus to any gaps in liabilities. Rather, it seemed to ask
more questions than it answered. The ISA will defer to the LTC to discuss more technical provisions of
the Draft Regulations. As such, from March 12 to 23, 2018, the LTC of the ISA will be meeting, with Part
2 of the Session of the ISA to take place in July, 2018. Whether or not additional question will be
addressed remains to be seen.
Given that many nations cannot yet agree on compliance and liability for the Area, it is more
important that academia provide guidance. Thus, the current state of the law of DSM should be compared
with other environmental assessment and liability laws in other marine contexts.118 To first compare with
other regimes, a gap analysis of the current law must be undertaken.
Gap Analysis
One of the gaps in knowledge is the type of mining that would be conducted on the seabed. One type of
mining would involve drilling into the seabed, similar to conventional oil drilling onshore. A second type
of mining would be a marine equivalent to “open pit” mining – that is, the extraction of minerals over a
wide area of the sea floor.119 As noted in Case 17, the type of mining will change the nature of due
diligence obligations, and even strict liability and damage claims may be altered. Thus, the Draft
Regulations need to address each type of mining with specific EA provisions, as the exploration
regulations have done.
A second gap in knowledge is scientific uncertainty, as the majority of the seafloor is
unexplored.120 Any extraction or even exploration could have a material negative impact on unknown
biota to the unknown extent, duration, and toxicity of plumes. 121 If the scientific community does not yet
know what types of living species are on the DSB, it is unclear as to how standards of conduct can be
drafted to deal with the types of harm that could occur. A precautionary approach and even a moratorium
on drilling would be for scientific advances to take place and provide for more evidence.
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Many scholars view that on-shore and near off-shore extraction poses more harms than DSM.122
A third unknown is the lack of knowledge on the extent of environmental and compensable damage that
may occur from DSM. Thus, any negligence or liability claim may not have the sufficient legal grounds
to warrant a finding of guilt on the contractor or sponsoring state. While Article 139 of the UNCLOS
creates a liability regime, the Annexes and Draft Regulations speak about a “wrongful act or omission”
threshold.123 There is no strict liability or negligence argument contained in the Draft Regulations.124
Moreover, the Environmental Management Plan does not contain any requirement to have insurance or
financing in place for any environmental damage. 125 The Draft Regulations are vague in their assessment
of liabilities for environmental damage. The issues of remoteness and other legal definitions, such as
“wrongful acts,” are neither defined nor explained.
As noted above, and to this end, a strong response to the Draft Regulations came from the
Australian delegation. Australia submits that it
is of the view that there needs to be more detail regarding the liability of a sponsoring state and
how it can take responsibility for ensuring exploitation is undertaken in a safe and
environmentally responsible manner. For example, the liability and enforcement mechanisms in
the Regulations need to act as an effective deterrent to prevent Contractors from causing
environmental harm or violating safety regulations. Australia suggests that, in addition to the
monetary penalties prescribed in Appendix III of the Draft Regulations, consideration should be
given to the application of monetary penalties for a broader range of breaches of environmental
regulations, such as the failure to adhere to the Environmental and Management Monitoring
Plan.126
The questions addressed in Case 17 are limited in scope and do not provide for a fulsome answer.
The SDC also notes that one consequence of the exclusion of water evacuation and disposal of material
from “activities in the Area” would be that the activities conducted by the contractor which are among the
most hazardous to the environment would be excluded from those to which the responsibilities of the
sponsoring State apply. 127 Case 17 did not address liability provisions of the flag State.
A fourth gap, therefore, includes the roles of the flag State and the vessel State (and potentially
the processing State) for responsibility and liability. It is the responsibility of the Authority to determine
both the rate at which exploitation of the Area will be allowed, and the methods in which the proceeds
from exploitation will be shared among the members of the international community, as well as between
current and future generations.128 African countries could very much, through a subsidiary of a
transnational corporation, sponsor their way into DSM, as small island states have done. 129 Developing
countries often has weak environmental protection legislation. 130 The lack of domestic DSM legislation in
122
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these jurisdictions is problematic, as there is no domestic environmental legislation to backstop a damage
claim. But, more importantly, the legislation below creates indemnification provisions for these States.
How States will be indemnified is still unknown. The most likely source will be in DSM insurance. The
Interoceanmetal Joint Organisation highlighted this fact in their response to the Draft Regulations, stating:
it should be carefully analyzed because actual suspension of mining operations in the Area,
taking into account the risks associated, predicted structure of the operational costs and cash
flow regime may very likely result in the real life in the mining termination with little chances
for recovering the production and all risks associated are included, including
environmental….Insurance cost should be recognized for the proper considerations of
contractor’s economic models ongoing now in the Authority. Probably, common insurance
conditions valid for all contracts should be proposed in further regulations. It is not clear if there
is now market for such kind of insurance. 131
More information and clarification on the role of financing and insurance is required, especially as the
SDC ruled out residual liability.132
Finally, the issue of which parties can bring claims is still unresolved.133 Not only are sponsoring
states and the ISA potential defendants, they are also potential claimants. In summation, there is still
much uncertainty over the provision requiring domestic legislation. The References are made to
Sponsoring States in the working draft, but the lines of duty and responsibility (jurisdictional competence)
between the Authority and sponsoring States (together with that of flag States, States Parties, and nonParties to the Convention and relevant international organizations, including the International Maritime
Organization) are not entirely clear. 134 For example, Australia “welcomed references to sponsoring states’
national legislation, noting that the system should also help contractors decide which sponsoring state to
approach.”135 Belgium stressed the need for: “a balanced relationship between the ISA and contractors;
clarity on monitoring rules to avoid “sponsor shopping”; and more attention to environmental
regulations.”136 China on the other hand, “arguing that sponsoring states that have taken necessary and
appropriate measures should not be held responsible for contractors’ misconduct.” 137 There is thus serious
disagreement over liability and obligations.138
PART 3 – STATE OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION OF DSM
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In Case 17, the SDC described due diligence as a variable concept, meaning that the standard could
change as technologies improve,139 and that there should be a higher standard for riskier activities. 140 The
SDC continues to point out that the UNCLOS requires the sponsoring State to adopt “laws and
regulations” and to take “administrative measures which are, within the framework of its legal system,
reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.”141
Following its discussion of due diligence, the SDC outlined the “direct obligations” of sponsoring
States under the UNCLOS and general international law. 142 The ISA invited countries to provide the texts
of their domestic legislation. 143 Nauru,144 Tonga,145 and even the United States have submitted their
legislation.146 Canada has not.147 Tonga, in 2017, had a population of just over 110,000 people. 148 Nauru
had a population of 13,049.149 The question must be asked: How can these two small countries possibility
have the legal systems in place to meet their due diligence requirements? A representative sample of
several countries will be canvassed, though it is beyond the scope of this article to review every country
that would have an interest in DSM in the Area.
Nauru and Tonga
The Nauru legislation is illustrative, stating that the “Sponsored Party shall be responsible for the
performance of all Seabed Mineral Activities carried out within the Contract Area, and their compliance
with the Rules of the ISA, and shall be liable for the actual amount of any compensation, damage or
penalties arising out of its failure so to comply, or out of any wrongful acts or omissions [emphasis
added] in the conduct of the Seabed Mineral Activities.” 150 Section 29(2) provides indemnification for
Nauru for all actions, proceedings, costs, charges, claims, and demands which may be made or brought by
any third party in relation to a Sponsored Party’s Seabed Mineral Activities. 151 Furthermore, section 46
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to establish liability and to provide recourse for prompt and
adequate compensation in the event of unlawful damage caused by Seabed Mineral Activities, in
accordance with article 235(2) of the UNCLOS.152
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For Tonga, section 70 and section 84 of the Tonga legislation153 are similar in wording to
Nauru’s. Section 70(3) provides the indemnification for Tonga, while the Licensee is liable for the actual
amount of any compensation or damage arising out of its failure to comply with this Act, Regulations
made under this Act, or the Licence, and any “wrongful acts or omissions” [emphasis added] and those of
its employees, officers, subcontractors, and agents in the conduct of the Seabed Mineral Activities or
Ancillary Operations under Licence, including but not limited to that arising from injury to coastal or
marine users, damage to the Marine Environment, and any related economic loss or compensation. 154
Section 70(4) provides for joint and several liabilities,155 while section 70(5) provides for the continuation
of liabilities even after all activities have ceased. 156
Case 17 highlighted the need to use the precautionary approach to due diligence. 157 However,
both provisions in Tonga and Nauru seem to absolve themselves from this due diligence requirement. The
use of “wrongful acts and omissions” is problematic, as a strict liability regime would not concern
whether an act is wrongful or not to warrant a liability claim. This does not seem to be a legislative
oversight, as section 109 of the Tonga legislation relates to non-interference with freedom of the high
seas.158 Section 109(5), creates a “strict liability” offence. 159 If section 109(4) specifically and explicitly
creates a strict liability offence, yet sections 70 and 84 create a “wrongful act” liability standard, then this
would preclude it from being strict liability. Finally, issues to be addressed in subsequent research include
the ability to enforce this legislation, make a claim against the vessel/operator, and collect compensation
awards.
Singapore
Singapore has enacted DSM legislation. In 2013, Singapore sponsored an application from a company
domiciled in the country. 160 The Deep Seabed Mining Act 2015 161 governs Singapore’s domestic DSM
legislation. Singapore directly quotes the need for due diligence per section 7(1) of the legislation when it
states that, before it will grant a license, the Minister must be satisfied that the company meets, or is likely
to meet, the qualification standards under Annex III, Article 4 of the UNCLOS.162 Moreover, the nation
requires a company to post security for the due performance of its obligations. 163 Unfortunately,
Singapore also requires an execution by the licensee to indemnify the nation against any liability
incurred;164 however, any breaches are only subject to a fine. 165
In contemplation of avoiding liabilities by using a corporate form, section 12(6) states that any
transfer of license does not affect any criminal or civil liability from the original licensee. 166 Section 16
provides for the government to order specific performance to prevent, contain, or minimize any harmful
environmental effects. 167 Finally, section 17 provides domestic enforcement of Annex III judgements. 168
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From an enforcement perspective, section 18 allows for SDC orders to be registered in Singapore, but a
state may still claim privilege or immunity. 169 However, the issue of strict liability for operators may not
be accurate, as section 21 of the legislation requires, for an offense, to prove consent or connivance of an
officer, or neglect on the officer’s part. 170
Canada
Given Canada’s role in DSM, its familiarity with mining, offshore oil and gas, and its extension of its
continental shelf claims beyond the 200-nautical mile limits,171 it is somewhat surprising that the nation
has not developed domestic legislation for DSM in the Area.172 While Canada does not have fulsome
legislation, there is evidence from regulation. The Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents Marine Protected Area
Regulations state:
s. 2 No person shall
(a) disturb, damage or destroy, in the Area, or remove from the Area, any part of the seabed,
including a venting structure, or any part of the subsoil, or any living marine organism or any
part of its habitat; or
(b) carry out any underwater activity in the Area that is likely to result in the disturbance,
damage, destruction or removal of anything referred to in paragraph (a). 173
This is a very strict obligation and one that could pose the question that the ISA has DSM regulation all
wrong. There is an argument for goal-based regulation as used in international shipping, which will be
discussed below. It also shows a potentially conflicting opinion between developed and developing
countries. Developed countries have more stringent legislation.
United Kingdom
The UK legislation for DSM is the Deep Sea Mining Act, 2014 (“UK 2014 Act”).174 This legislation
updates the previous legislation, the Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act 1981 (Temporary
Act).175 The UK has significant investments in the CCZ through the UK Seabed Resourced Ltd. 176 Like
Singapore, the UK expressly allows for enforcement of the SDC to be taken in the UK High Court,
including arbitration awards.177 Intriguingly, section 10 of the UK 2014 Act expressly omits section 10 of
the Temporary Act, which had created a Deep Sea Mining Fund. The liability provisions solely deal with
personal injury, not environmental damage. 178 The only environmental protection stems from section 5 of
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the Temporary Act and deals with the grant of a license, not in the damage caused to the marine
environment.179
On a positive note, there is no indemnification provision in the legislation, so the UK has not
absolved itself of liability. However, the remaining sections are weak on environmental protections. The
legislation seems to delegate to the ISA and the UNCLOS, all other claims for damage. This does not
appear to satisfy section 235 of UNCLOS, which requires fulsome domestic legislation.
China
The final domestic jurisdiction to be canvassed is China. 180 Its approach is based upon their 2016
legislation.181 China is a major player in DSM exploration, with over four exploration contracts with the
ISA, 182 two of which are with State-owned enterprises.183 China’s legislation appears to be more
complete than other nations explored, with seven chapters and 29 articles. Environmental pollution and
damage to cultural relics is contained in Articles 9(3), 11, and 12. Fines for pollution/damage can range
from CNY500,000 to 1,000,000, and if the illegal activities constitute a crime, criminal responsibility
entails.184 The legislation itself provides for “reasonably appropriate” environmental protections, and one
notable area omitted is in Environmental Assessments.185 Other fiscal arrangements are omitted, and as
Xu notes “before exploitation activities commence, fiscal issues should be in place”.186 It is unclear
whether the above penalties provide limits to liabilities by the operator, although the potential for criminal
charges is a novel approach. Foreign investment is omitted from the legislation. 187 This would impact the
effectiveness of the common heritage of mankind doctrine, as well as the practicalities of the size and
scope of DSM operations.
In this summary canvass of domestic legislation, there is a broad range of theoretical approaches,
and all have significant flaws and omissions. Tonga and Nauru seem to alter the strict liability to a
“wrongful act” regime, and limit their own liabilities, in contrast to Case 17. The UK takes a “hands-off”
approach, which seems to leave to the international system to fill in the gaps. Unfortunately, if the
international system has gaps, then there is nothing to fill in. Finally, China’s legislation seems to cap
liabilities,188 so it may not compensate for the environmental harms caused. However, some evidence
from their approach to oil spills may provide clarity.
PART 4 – LESSONS FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
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Civil Liability Regimes
There are several relevant international conventions that deal with liability for damage to the marine
environment. The Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (CLC) provides for strict liability on the part of the registered owner of the tanker to pay
compensation for “pollution damage.” 189 The CLC explicitly uses the term “negligence.”190 It also raised
the limits of liability, established a compulsory insurance requirement, and introduced the possibility of a
direct action against the insurer. 191 Norway would appear to be the only state that has extended its
application of the CLC (as implemented nationally) to oil pollution on the high seas; that action benefits
both the environment and the polluting ship-owner.192
The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds are a key component of this strict liability
regime. Claims from the Torrey Canyon spill, to which compensation was only available via international
maritime law, required a claim of negligence and gave the ship-owner the right to limit liability to
amounts deemed insufficient. 193 The Fund created a levy system and explicitly covers compensation for
reasonable measures to reinstate an environment to its pre-contaminated state.194
In this regard, China’s updated legislation is illustrative. Section 66 of the Marine Environmental
Protection Law, 1999 195 created the compensation fund for vessel oil pollution, and the 2010 regulations
increased liability limits and made insurance mandatory. 196 This fund is a key and critical component of
environment protections, as it applies when the damage exceeds the operator’s liability and/or ability to
pay, when the operator is exempted from liability, and when the source of pollution cannot be
ascertained.197 Compensation for vessel source oil pollution plays an essential role in protecting the
interests of victims and in the prevention of oil pollution. 198 This is a glaring flaw in the DSM regime.
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001199 was
adopted to ensure that adequate, prompt, and effective compensation is available to persons who suffer
damage caused by spills of oil, when the oil is carried as fuel in ships’ bunkers.200 This convention applies
to damage caused to the territory, including the territorial sea, and in exclusive economic zones of States
Parties.201 Another key provision is the requirement for direct action. This would allow a claim for
compensation for pollution damage to be brought directly against an insurer. 202
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The not-yet in force 2010 Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention203 (HNS) sets out a
shared liability regime to compensate claimants for damages arising from the international or domestic
carriage of HNS by seagoing vessels. 204 It has both ship-owners liability and an HNS Fund provision. 205
The ship-owners liability is a strict liability regime, while the HNS liability is either a negligence standard
or, if the ship-owner cannot pay, a strict liability standard. 206
This convention would greatly expand liability, compared to Canadian domestic legislation, from
a maximum of CA$16 million to CA$74 million (for a 20,000 tonne ship) and a total maximum liability
of CA$500 million.207 This is another example of how domestic legislation may be insufficient to cover
the harms to the environment. However, the Canadian approach has a wider scope than the international
regime and pays on claims having to do with both persistent oil and non-persistent oil pollution
discharged from all classes of ships.208
The main takeaway is that various international agreements provide for strict liability for
environmental damage. The evidence seems to indicate that the number of oil spills and the amount of oil
that has been discharged has declined over the last number of years. 209 Yet, the phrasing of the Draft
Regulations and domestic legislation seems to provide for a “wrong act or omission” standard.
The United States is the most significant maritime nation that has chosen not to be a party to the
UNCLOS and instead has developed its own national law concerning liability for oil pollution
damages.210 In the United States, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill demonstrated the consequences of a
major environmental disaster in the marine environment. 211 The case illustrated domestic liability
legislation and certain issues with the concept of “pure economic loss.”212
The United States imposes a strict liability without fault on all responsible parties for oil
discharges.213 Responsible parties include the owner, operator, or charterer of a vessel, the owner or
operator of an onshore oil facility; the lessee, permittee, and owner and operator of any offshore facility;
the owner and operator of a pipeline; and the licensee of a deep-water port.214 Furthermore, the United
States has created an Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 215
The United States is not a party to the UNCLOS, so it will be interesting to note their DSM
activities, and their liabilities for environmental damage should be involved as either a vessel State, a flag
State, or a port/processing State. However, it is this type of legislation that is required; strict and
unlimited liability for all parties, with an environmental liability fund if damages are larger than one party
can or will pay.216
In summation, the civil liability regimes provide great evidence as to the correct approach for
DSM liability. The regulations are clear, provide for strict liability for operators, and no indemnification
203
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for State parties. Furthermore, the technology fund provides for the extra bit of “insurance” to ensure that
there are funds to clean up any environmental spill. 217
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Provisions
As noted in Part 1, the Solwara 1 in PNG’s EEZ could be highly comparative to DSM in the Area.
Unfortunately, PNG does not have any laws on DSM in the EEZ that would regulate Solwara 1. 218 Thus,
both PNG and Nautilus may work with “environmental impunity.”219 While a limited amount of onshore
processing will occur in PNG, the majority of processing will occur in China. 220 One potential saving
grace is, as previously noted, that Nautilus is a Canadian company and listed under the TSX. The
provincial securities acts, for example in British Columbia,221 and the TSX require certain mandatory
disclosures and risk assessments, and investors should be cognizant of potential company liabilities.222 At
the date of writing, the project is showing significant financial hurdles. In December, 2017, a citizens
group, represented by the Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights Inc. (Celcor) and
assisted by the New South Wales Environmental Defenders Office commenced a lawsuit against PNG
claiming insufficient EA procedures for the project.223 There is thus significant uncertainty about if this
project will begin.
New Zealand has a novel approach to DSM, at least within its EEZ. Their legislation, The
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (Environmental Effects) 2012 (“NZ Act”),224
provides that non-discharge offenses are subject to strict liability. 225 DSM in the EEZ was considered in
the Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd. Marine Consent Decision,226 and highlighted the uncertainty of the
determination of costs of potentially adverse effects.227 In the face of this uncertainty, the use of the
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precautionary approach is mandated, but even this approach has “no easy answers.”228 The license was
granted, but it is currently under appeal. 229
The Trans-Tasman case may have implications for DSM in the Area, as adequate information on
the effects on the environment, monitoring baseline data, and adaptive management approaches are
required.230 This could all have implications on the due diligence requirement from Case 17. There is
another interesting issue with liability – the ability to collect. According to Makgill, “in practical terms,
the ability to recover damages is likely to be governed by the financial resources available to those
liable.”231 As a valid example, Nautilus is having significant financial obstacles, and without an
environmental trust fund or significant insurance policies in place, it is unlikely that any environmental
damage claim, even if awarded, could be collected. The ISA needs to take action.
Flag State Liabilities
Many boundary questions remain, including the line between flag State and sponsoring State liability.232
Flag State liabilities arise from Articles 209(2), 211 and Article 217 of the UNCLOS. Article 209(2)
states that flag States shall adopt laws to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from vessels flying under
their flag.233 States shall ensure compliance of vessels flying under their flag. 234 However, there is a lack
of full clarity to their application to DSM in the Area and on the standard of liability and amount of
damages that a flag State could face, should environmental damage occur due to DSM. Thus,
international law precedent on liabilities of flag States and on operators from other settings would prove
useful in the DSM context.
On April 2, 2015, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rendered an advisory opinion
on the rights and obligations of flag States and coastal States regarding illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (“IUU”) fishing within the EEZ (Case 21).235 Ownership of fishing vessels also comprises a
“complex structure of nominated front companies and/or non-disclosed beneficial owners.”236 The
tribunal noted that flag States have a “due diligence” obligation to ensure that vessels sailing under their
flag take the necessary measures to comply with the protection and preservation measures adopted by
member states.237 The State must also have domestic legislation to enforce these rules. 238
More importantly, the Tribunal in Case 21 relied heavily on Case 17 to advance its
jurisprudence.239 Like Case 17, the standard of liability for flag States arises not out of the actions of the
operator, but in the failure to comply with its due diligence obligation. 240 The Tribunal noted:
228
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Although the relationship between sponsoring States and contractors is not entirely
comparable to that existing between the flag State and vessels flying its flag which are
engaged in fishing activities in the exclusive economic zone of the coastal State, the Tribunal
holds the view that the clarifications provided by the Seabed Disputes Chamber regarding
the meaning of the expression “responsibility to ensure” and the interrelationship between
the notions of obligations “of due diligence” and obligations “of conduct” referred to in
paragraph 129 are fully applicable in the present case. 241
Thus, flag State liabilities are the same as sponsoring State liabilities, in that it is their responsibility to
ensure to deploy the adequate means and exercise best possible efforts to obtain this result. 242 The liability
of the flag State arises from a failure to comply with its “due diligence” obligations.243
The issue of flag State liability also arose in the China-Philippines dispute.244 The tribunal stated
that anything less than a due diligence standard by the flag State to avoid IUU would fall short of the
UNCLOS.245 Moreover, as there is such a close link between Chinese fishing vessels and the Chinese
government, there is a heightened obligation on the part of the flag State.246
This case is relevant to DSM due to the marine environmental protection obligations of flag
States. The obligations noted in China-Philippines apply to flag States regardless of the location of the
harmful activities; thus, jurisdiction is not dependent on sovereignty or the existence of an EEZ.247 It also
displays the extent of how an EA would fulfill a due diligence defense. The Draft Regulations provide for
a need for an EA to be granted a license to conduct DSM in the area. Case 17 specifically noted that due
diligence requirements will differ based on the type of mining. China-Philippines could provide evidence
as to the extent of the requirements, specifically with the use of EA. China-Philippines noted that the
existence (or lack thereof) of an EA is important, but it is not definitive in determining whether there is a
breach of its requirements under Article 206. 248 Moreover, China’s DSM firms are state-controlled
operations, and thus the flag State, sponsoring State, and operator all may be deemed the same and have
higher obligations for liability. 249 EAs should assist in meeting a due diligence threshold, but by
themselves they may not absolve a flag State from liability.
PART 5 – ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Much more work needs to be conducted to ensure that fulsome liability provisions are in place for DSM
in the Area. The liability regime should reflect a transnationalist approach with a stewardship doctrine.
Thus, the use of the Precautionary Principle makes abundant sense, especially because of scientific
uncertainty. When taken in context with the Sustainable Development Goals and the “common heritage of
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mankind,” this makes an even more compelling argument. According to the Sustainable Development
Goal 14, the oceans and seas are to be conserved and developed in a sustainable manner.250
Operators
Operator liability seems to depend on the definition of a “wrongful act or omission,” the language used in
the UNCLOS and the Draft Regulations. Case 17 highlighted the need for different due diligence
standards for different types of mining. This may have inadvertently tipped the hand that the strict
liability will not be enforced, even for contractor/operators. This regime seems to lead back to the general
international maritime law surrounding environmental damage.
To answer, some evidence is provided by the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles).251 While not in force, and applicable to state parties, these
Draft Articles may assist in articulating the elements of the offense. Article 2 states that there is an
internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation
of the State.252 Unfortunately, the accompanying commentaries determine that the interpretation of a
breach may be subjective (i.e., with intent or knowledge) or objective (i.e. inadvertence or negligence). 253
Thus, the offense may be both intentional and negligent. Either definition seems to preclude strict
liability. If negligence is the standard, then there is also a due diligence defense. And, as Case 17 noted,
due diligence may depend on the quality of the Environmental Assessments (EA) conducted.
Environmental Assessments (also known as Environmental Impact Assessments) are used to
anticipate, assess, and reduce environmental and social risks from a project. 254 The ISA requires an EA
for the Area,255 but it is not a robust regime.256 There are several accepted criteria for a fulsome EA
process. This process includes screening, scoping, EA, environmental management plans, external
reviews by experts, public stakeholder consultations, and regulatory reviews. 257 EA standards may also
limit liability based on the Draft Regulations. If the Operator has an EA approved by the ISA, but
environmental damage occurs, then it is unclear whether the operator will be liable, absent a “wrongful
act or omission.”
The Environmental liability and common heritage may be at odds.
Even where adherence to international rules is demonstrated, there would remain potential for
inconsistent interpretation and application of those rules that may need to be resolved. As a
consequence, there will be a need for both vertical (Authority – sponsoring state) and horizontal
(between sponsoring states) harmonization of EA processes and related compliance action to
avoid conflicting directions and duplication.258
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The ability to pay is also very much in question. Interoceanmetal’s casual observation is relevant.
They stated that the insurance industry may not be ready to make a policy. Moreover, as will be detailed
in a follow-up research paper, it is difficult to conceive of how such a policy would take place, given the
unknown liability, amount of damage, limit on liability, indemnification of sponsoring States, and other
factors. As a matter of international law, it seems that every State has the right to combat pollution on the
high seas, but no existing legal regime appears to provide for compensation. The ISA needs to clarify
liabilities of operators, create a levy system to create a fund, and assist the insurance industry to create
DSM policies. In other words, the international community, through the civil liability regimes discussed
above, have created a mutually beneficial solution that benefits both the environment and the business
community. The ISA should follow this solution for DSM. Unfortunately, through domestic legislation,
liability seems to be going in the opposite direction.
Sponsoring States
Case 17 is the representative precedent for sponsoring State liability. It is also clear that there should be
no distinction of liability for developing or developed States.259 To use a somewhat colloquial
comparison, “with great power comes great responsibility.” 260 Countries want to harvest and exploit the
minerals on the DSB, but in terms of the Area, they do not want to have any liabilities and have legislated
indemnifications for any liability that is due. This seems inherently contradictory to Case 17 and the due
diligence defense, and the protection of the environment. The watering down from a State needing to take
all steps necessary to only reasonable steps necessary shows a weakening of environmental protections.
Domestic legislation does not assist in the matter and may further weaken environmental
protections. Nauru and Tonga seem to completely absolve themselves of any liability. The UK takes a
hands-off approach, seemingly leaving it to the ISA. The United States takes a strict liability approach, at
least with EEZ and oil spill legislation. New Zealand takes a very precautionary approach, both with EEZ
and in the Area. Singapore takes a middle ground. Belgium may have a point – there is a real potential of
sponsors shopping to avoid liability. This contradicts the necessity of sections 209 and 235 of the
UNCLOS, requiring domestic legislation and enforcing compensation claims.
The biggest unknown still is in compensation claims if operators cannot or will not pay. The
indemnification clauses, pragmatically, are only relevant if the operator has the financial means. A
compulsory insurance regime and a levy based environmental fund would solve many of these issues.
Plakokefalos notes “it remains to be seen how the Opinion will play out in the unfortunate case where
damage in the Area does occur and how the States will react to it in their subsequent practice.” 261
Flag States
While there are similarities between flag States and sponsoring States, there are significant differences. 262
The Solwara 1 case is again illustrative. Nautilus does not own the ship but is chartering the ship from
Dubai. UNCLOS section 91(1) states that there must be a genuine connection to register a vessel.
Moreover, the flag State must exercise effective jurisdiction over the vessel. 263 Cases 17, 21, and the
China-Philippines Arbitration seem to indicate that a flag State also may be liable if they fail in their
obligations to oversee the vessel. The due diligence defense seems to be the same as those of the
259
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sponsoring state. However, there is no domestic legislation specifically required for flag States as it
relates to DSM in the Area. Dubai/the UAE, for instance, does not have DSM legislation.
As Case 17 noted, due diligence depends on the type of mining. The requirements of EA may
provide evidence of meeting this obligation. But, given China’s omission of EA in their domestic
legislation and given the response of the tribunal in PCA, they could breach the requirements of Articles
209 and thus not meet their liability requirements. The ISA needs to create specific EA standards for each
type of mining and clarify how they differ in order for sponsoring and flag States to meet their
obligations.
International Seabed Authority
The ISA is a party to potential DSM environmental claims and thus could be liable. The “wrongful act”
provides the requisite standard, and it seems to have the due diligence defense as per Case 17. Case 21
also noted liability of an international organization. 264 In Case 21, it was the organization that granted
fishing licenses. This would be akin and comparable to the ISA, which grants exploration and exploitation
licenses. The indemnification clause in section 8.2 of the Draft Regulations, however, weakens this
standard, without creating a mechanism by which operators may actually have the financial capabilities of
indemnifying the other parties.
The ISA states that it is in agreement with environmental protections and the precautionary
approach, at least in theory. The ISA has reaffirmed its position on the environment in its strategic plan. 265
Unfortunately, these positions do not specifically state that they will ensure the effective cleanup and
remediation of any environmental damage, should it occur, nor ensure that there are funds available to
assist with the remediation. Whether or not the ISA retains any residual liability remains unknown.
CONCLUSION
The evidence all indicates that there are still too many unknowns to proceed with exploitation of DSM in
the Area without further developing the legal obligations of all parties. The ISA is in a powerful position
to grant licenses. It needs to take a step back, develop much more robust regulations to prevent
environmental damage, and ensure that remediation of the environment can take place if environmental
damage occurs. Currently, there is no mechanism for this assurance.
There is a real concern that the Draft Regulations will be watered down due to certain Asian and
developing countries’ concerns, as shown by the responses in the 24th Session of the ISA. With the ISA
aiming for a July, 2018, release of the next round of Draft Regulations, in time for Part 2 of the 24th
session of the ISA on July 24, 2018 there does not appear to be enough time or appetite to make the
regulations more stringent. The lack of an environmental fund is the most glaring omission. This is an
oversight and potentially hazardous outcomes may result.
On November 15, 2017, the UN General Assembly Resolution A/72/L.7 convened a conference
for 2018, 2019, and 2020 to discuss the implementation of a binding agreement on the conservation and
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. 266 This would include
the Area and would have repercussions for DSM. The ISA needs to take the outcomes of this conference
and ensure that that protection of the marine environment in the Area is protected.
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It seems like “the tail is wagging the dog,” in that the technology seems to be determining the
law, rather than the law determining the liability.267 Clearly, the international community can do better.
The civil liability regimes provide such evidence. DSM is potentially destructive to the environment and
much more work is required. The current liability regime is too weak and too unknown to provide a
framework for such a large-scale industry.
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